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Fiscal loosening during the 2004 Presidential election campaign: 
three steps towards instability   
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Sasha BETLIY, Vitaliy BIGDAI, Richard FRENSCH, Natalie LESCHENKO, and VERONIKA MOVCHAN 
The current paper analyses the draft budget for 2005
 submitted to the Verkhovna Rada on 14 September 2004. 
Summary and Recommendations 
The 2004 Presidential election campaign has left a deep effect on the budget process 2004-2005, 
which came about in three steps: (1) In the course of amending the 2004 budget, privatization receipts 
were misused to finance higher minimum pension payments, raising net public liabilities in the future. 
(2)   The draft budget 2005 envisages   further   increases in transfers to the population and in sector­
specific state aid. If all liabilities are taken into account, the resulting deficit of the central budget will 
reach 3% of   GDP in 2005, provided there is no correction on the expenditure or revenue side. This is 
extremely inappropriate in a high growth environment as Ukraine’s. (3) Fulfilling all social promises 
made by presidential candidates during the campaign will create an additional fiscal gap of some 1.9% 
of   GDP in 2005. Besides, there are high risks on the revenue side that might result in an additional 
fiscal gap up to 3% of   GDP, and doubtful privatization receipts that may increase the need for external 
borrowing, raising serious fiscal sustainability concerns. 
The ensuing fiscal instability would negatively affect   the so   far   excellent overall macroeconomic 
situation. Rapid increases   of transfers to the population will contribute to price pressure on the final 
goods market. There is thus an urgent need to implement corrective measures, which, however, are 
subject to various, mostly political constraints. As we consider the political costs   of   renegotiating the 
2004 budget amendments to be too high to be taken on, we rather propose: 
•  	  not to incorporate additional social promises into the draft budget 2005, such   as   those made by   the 
presidential candidates during the 2004 campaign; 
•  	  to restrict state aid to coal mining and agriculture; 
•  	  to continue to broaden the tax base by cutting tax privileges. 
While all this   will help to decrease the fiscal imbalances outlined above, it will not be sufficient to 
prevent price pressure from the budget. Solving the fiscal and macroeconomic   imbalances   brought 
about during the election campaign thus calls for a joint fiscal and monetary policy response. 








                                                     
1.   The 2004 presidential elections and 
fiscal loosening 
The 2004 presidential election campaign had a 
heavy effect on the budget process   2004–2005. 
This   came   about in three steps of expenditures 
expansion, while additional risks loom on the 
revenue side. 
1. In the course of amending the 2004 budget, 
higher than expected receipts from privatiza­
tion were misused to finance increases in re­
current public expenditures. These amend­
ments   increased the projected 2004 central 
budget expenditures from 19.2% to 23.5% 
GDP (columns A and B in Table 1). In par­
ticular,   in September 2004 the government 
approved payments of additional social aid to 
pensioners,   whose monthly pensions are 
lower than UAH 284. In effect, this   amounts   to 
an increase of the minimum nominal pension 
payment from UAH 132.8 to UAH 284 per 
2  month,  and means higher payments to nearly 
80% of all pensioners. 
During 2004, this requires an additional 
monthly financing of UAH 1 bn. We expect a 
continuation of this practice in the future   also 
for political reasons. As pensions in Ukraine 
are indexed to inflation and wage growth, the 
need for social aid to cover the gap between 
low pensions and the minimum   nominal 
monthly pension payment fixed at the level of 
UAH 284 will decline over   time. Still, net public 
liabilities have been considerably   increased for 
2005 and beyond, when the government must 
find other sources for financing the additional 
bill once privatization receipts are fully used. 
3  2.  The draft budget 2005  continues this expan­
sionary   path and envisages further increases 
in social welfare payments, pension payments, 
wage payments   of budget sector employees, 
and state aid. The main items are various   so­
cial benefits to pensioners and compensation 
for losses of Sberbank   depositors   from   the 
early 1990s. (for details, see Table A1 in the 
Appendix). What is more, the 2005 draft 
budget does so far not incorporate the in­
creased minimum pension payment liabilities 
taken on by the government in September 
2004. If these liabilities are taken into account 
2 UAH 284 is the 2004 monthly subsistence minimum for 
persons unable to work. 
3 In this paper, the Draft Budget Law 2005 refers to the ver­
sion submitted to the Verkhovna Rada on 14 September, 
2004. 
(column D in Table 1), and provided there is 
no correction on the revenue and/or   the ex­
penditure   side, the resulting central govern­
ment fiscal deficit will reach 3%   of   GDP in 
2005. 
At the same   time, the draft budget 2005 
contains   tax revenue risks associated with in­
consistencies   with other legislative provisions 
and administrative difficulties. In particular,   the 
budget is drafted on the assumption that tax 
privileges   terminated by the 2004 State 
Budget Law will not be recovered in 2005. 
However,   there are so far no legislative provi­
sions to ensure this, and the consequent loss 
4  in revenues might reach up to 2.75% of   GDP.
Also, the budget is based on a 20% rate of 
value added tax (VAT), which provides   almost 
one third of consolidated fiscal revenues. If   the 
5  provisions of the Budget Resolution for   2005
concerning the VAT rate reduction to 17% are 
applied, the revenue loss might equal UAH 1 
6 bn (0.2% of   GDP).  An additional risk relates 
to personal income tax (PIT) revenues, the 
share of which is about 13% in consolidated 
fiscal revenues. The increase of the subsis­
tence minimum, adopted by the Verkhovna 
Rada in October 2004, which defines the 
number   of people eligible for social privilege, 
might cause a reduction in net PIT   revenues. 
Furthermore, administrative difficulties may 
cause an additional gap in tobacco excise 
collection if the minimum amount of ad-
valorem excise, applied under the State 
Budget 2004 law, will not be re-introduced for 
2005. 
3.  A further expansion of   public   expenditures, 
e.g. via incorporating the additional social 
promises   made by presidential candidates 
during the 2004 campaign, would pose an 
even higher danger for the fiscal and macro­
economic stability. Fulfilling these social 
promises would again raise re-current ex­
penditures, creating an additional fiscal gap 
of some 1.9% of GDP in 2005. 
This policy is extremely inappropriate in a high 
growth environment such as   Ukraine’s   and the 
resulting fiscal instability will negatively   affect   the 
so far excellent macroeconomic situation. 
4 IMF estimate. 
5 
  The Budget Resolution was adopted by the Verkhovna 
Rada in June 2004. 




   
 
 
   
 







   
 
   
   
   
Table 1:  Fiscal expansion: selected central fiscal expenditure items in 2004 and 2005 
(% of GDP*) 
A  B  C  D  E  D    
2004 state 

















Transfers to the Pension Fund 
Compensation of savings of 
Oschadbank 
Transfers to local budgets  for 
social welfare and privileges to 
population 







































N.B.: Total central budget 
expenditures  19.2  23.5  23.0  24.7  1.9  26.6 
6  Central fiscal deficit 1.8  2.4  1.3  3.0  4.9 
+ E 
*  For the table we used IER nominal GDP forecasts: UAH 334 bn in 2004, UAH 404 bn in 2005.
 
1  Source: The Law on State Budget for 2004, N1344-IV, 27 November, 2003.
 




3  Source: The Draft Law on State Budget for 2005, N6000.
 
4  Including UAH 7 bn, needed to finance social aid to pensioners introduced in September 2004.
 
5  Estimate of the minimum cost of increasing social expenditures proposed on average by the two leading Presidential candidates before Novem­
ber 1
st; this includes increases of minimum pensions and the minimum   wage to the level of the subsistence minimum for 2005 and higher social
 
welfare payments to the population. Source: own estimates. 
6  Without correction on the revenue and/or the expenditure side. 
2. Political promises and risks 
2.1. Pension payments 
The Pension Fund budget is planned to be inc­
reased by around UAH 10 bn up to UAH 43.6 bn 
in 2005. So far, this includes a State Budget 
transfer of UAH 5.1 bn, UAH 2.6 bn higher than in 
2004.
7  However, the 2005 Pension Fund budget 
had been drafted before the CMU introduced 
additional social aid to pensioners in September 
2004. Hence, it does not foresee the funds nee­
ded to finance this social aid. Since the Pension 
Fund has limited own sources of revenues, and 
as the State Budget is the ultimate source of fi­
nancing its deficit, this will have to be financed at 
the expense of state budget money. Due to pen­
sion increases, the number of pensioners eligible 
for social aid will next year be lower than in 2004. 
Nevertheless, in order to cover all liabilities, the 
Pension Fund’s budget will have to amount to at 
least UAH 50 bn. Consequently, its approximate 
� 
  This   com
tional trans
duced in S
parison does   not yet take into account the addi­
fer provided in 2004 for financing social   aid intro­
eptember 2004. If taken into account   the transfer 
is increased by UAH 0.5 bn. 
deficit, and respective increase of the State bud­
get transfer, amounts to about UAH 7 bn, which 
increases 2005 central government expenditures 
by 1.7% of GDP (see Table 1, column D). 
2.2. State aid expansion 
One of the priorities of the recent fiscal expansion 
is state support to commercial sectors, in parti­
cular to agriculture and coal mining. There is little 
economic rationale for executing these expendi­
tures at the expense of public budget funds. 
Agriculture: The draft budget for 2005 almost 
doubles state support to agriculture, pushing it up 
to 7.5 % of total central budget expenditures. 
Ukraine’s intended WTO accession poses seve­
ral limits on state support of the agricultural sec­
tor. In particular, this concerns the reduction of 
‘Amber box’ measures of state aid in the form of 
subsidies, tax privileges, cheap credits, interven­
tion operations with grain, etc. However, the 2005 
draft budget envisages almost doubling funds for 
such measures to UAH 3.6 bn. By contrast, the 
financing of ‘Green Box’ measures (permitted by 
WTO agreements) for the development of rural 
areas, R&D, education, pest and crop control, 
etc. is increased by only 1.5 times in comparison 
Nr. 21 
Januar 2005 








     
 
 
   
 
to 2004 to UAH 2 bn. Hence, the perceived inc-
rease in state aid to agriculture   is   not compatible 
with the targeted WTO accession, sustainable 
f 
 
development objectives, and an efficient use o
public funds. 
Coal mining: State support of coal mining is
summarized in the ‘Ukrainian Coal’ program ap-
proved by the government in 2001. To finance 
this   program, the draft budget for 2005 increases 
expenditures by UAH 0.5 bn (Table 2). Funds 
assigned for subsidizing current costs of operation 
are planned to be even higher than envisaged by 
the ‘Ukrainian Coal’ program, at the cost of capital 
transfers. As evidence from   the past suggests, 
state aid to coal mining will most probably be inc­
reased by parliament during the budget process. 
Table 2:  Central fiscal expenditures for coal mining support (UAH bn) 
Program “Ukrainian Coal”  State budget 2004  Draft budget 2005 
for 2005  with amendments 
Current cost subsidies  0.5  0.7  0.8 
Capital transfers  2.3  1.5  1.8 
Restructuring  0.3  0.8  0.8 
Total  3.3  2.9  3.4 
Sources: Law on State budget 2004 with latest amendments, draft budget for 2005, state program “Ukrainian Coal” from 19.09.2001 #1205. 
3. The real costs of fiscal expansion: 
loss of fiscal stability and inflationary 
pressure   
3.1. Loss of fiscal stability 
The expansionary nature of the 2004 budget 
amendments and the draft budget for 2005, in 
conjunction with further election promises by 
politicians, threaten fiscal stability and even 
sustainability. The problem is exacerbated in 
2005 by risks related to the revenue side, ex-
hausted privatization receipts, and limited sour­
ces of borrowing. 
Privatization: Privatization prospects for 2005 are 
highly uncertain. The Draft Budget 2005 foresees 
privatization receipts of about UAH 4 bn. The 
principal part of this is to come from the sale of 
42.86% of national fixed line operator Ukrtelecom 
(some UAH 4 bn is expected) and 94.54% of the 
Odessa portside chemical factory (more than 
UAH 1 bn expected), the sale of which were 
suspended before the presidential elections. 
While the privatization of Ukrtelecom in the next 
year is uncertain, the Government has already 
approved a moratorium on the privatization of the 
Odessa portside factory. 
Borrowing: External borrowing will remain the 
only source of financing the budget deficit due to 
the limited domestic demand for bonds. Borro­
wing opportunities for Ukraine on international 
capital markets have increased as the sovereign 
credit rating has been repeatedly upgraded and 
international reserves have steadily grown in 
2004. Total nominal state debt stood at USD 14.5 
bn at the end of 2003 and is expected to reach 
USD 15.5 bn at the end of   2004. It is   to be inc­
reased further during 2005 to USD 15.6 bn ac­
cording to the 2005 draft budget thus growing by 
more than 7.6% since the year 2003. Without 
even taking account of the revenue risks descri­
bed above, the worst case scenario on the ex­
penditure   side described in Table 1 (Column 
D+E) would drive up state debt to about USD 
19.2 bn (25.1% of GDP). Repeated deficit finan­
cing at that order of magnitude will not only ham­
per   the fiscal position but also endanger external 
stability. 
However,   it would be extremely unwise to utili­
ze   the opportunity for state borrowing at the time 
of   economic   growth rather than to preserve it for 
a time where there’s less opportunities to tax a 
growing economy. The policy of expanding state 
debt even in times of economic boom   is   un­
sustainable in the long run and is represents a 
dangerous attitude towards state finances. Pur­
suing state borrowing when revenues   are relati­
vely   high is a short-sighted practice as it negati­
vely   affects   the state’s borrowing chances later in 
the business cycle when such   borrowing is   crucial 
for balancing the budget and stimulating the eco­
nomy. 
3.2. Inflationary pressure 
The Ukrainian economy is growing at an impres­
sive rate of 13% a year in 2004 and is expected 
to show 8% growth in 2005. This naturally puts 
upward pressure on prices, as the economy ope­
rates close to full capacity. Price responses also 
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depend on the ability of producers to expand as a 
reaction to higher demand. Unfortunately, recent 
state interventions in price formation certainly 
discourage producers from investing and expan­
ding production. In this situation, fiscal imbalan­
ces will soon spill over to create other macroeco­
nomic imbalances: high transfers to the populati­
on will add to price pressure, especially if these 
transfers are increased at discretion rather than 
according to a foreseeable schedule. 
Tentative IER estimates, based on Derzh­
komstat statistics, show that the market size for 
agricultural and food-industry products consumed 
by Ukrainian households constitutes some UAH 
4-5 bn per month,
8 while the amount of additional 
payments from the fiscal expansion is about UAH 
1 bn per month only for pensioners. Assuming 
that half of this is directed towards purchases of 
food products, the resulting increase in demand 
amounts to 11-14%. Unless supported by expan­
ded production, which is unlikely as pointed out 
above, this additional demand will turn into price 
increases. Given the generally low elasticity of 
demand for food products, these price increases 
can be expected to be quite significant. However, 
due to temporary delays of pension payments 
and social aid for pensioners payments, caused 
by political situation, the pressure on prices has 
lowered recently. Consequently, the IER fore­
casts quite high 9.1% yoy CPI change for 2005
9 
in comparison to 7% assumed in the draft budget. 
Price increases may over the medium term 
translate into continuous inflation if they trigger off 
rising wages, which in turn again result in higher 
prices, i.e. in a price-wage spiral. This danger is 
especially immanent if such a price-wage spiral is 
accommodated by monetary policy. This will be 
very much of an issue after the end of this year, 
when markets expect a softening of the fixed 
exchange rate policy of recent years, and thus a 
higher autonomy of the central bank over the 
money supply. 
8
 This market size estimate for agricultural and food­
industry products consumed by Ukrainian households 
results from a combination of two approaches. (1) 
Approximate the size of the market on the basis of 
final households consumption from national accounts 
statistics. (2) Estimate size using output in agriculture 
and food industry in 2004 and the output shares of 
these sectors consumed by households as provided in 
the input-output table for 2002. 
9 Price trends observed in November 2004 have been 
in line with IER forecasts: inflation was 11.3% yoy. In 
December 2004 the monthly consumer price inflation 
is forecast at 2%. It is expected that current uncertain­
ties on the durable goods market will have a very 
minor impact on the price index since the share of 
these products in the CPI bundle is low. 
4. Solutions and (political) constraints 
The 2005 central fiscal deficit might significantly 
exceed the 1.3% of GDP currently projected by 
the 2005 draft budget. Accounting for the re­
current obligations from the 2004 budget a­
mendment and incorporating the social promises 
of   presidential candidates (Table 1), the deficit to 
GDP ratio might even be in excess of 5%, if some 
risks   on the revenue side (section 3.1) materiali­
ze. 
Ways   out of this situation are subject to politi­
cal, fiscal and macroeconomic constraints. A 
small part of the problem might be ‘solved’ by 
inflation that might be higher than government 
estimates. This will both reduce the real value of 
increased social transfers to the population and 
also most probably cause higher   increases   in 
government revenues than in its expenditures, 
taking Ukrainian evidence into account. However, 
this will by no means be sufficient to cover   the 
gap outlined in the worst case scenario described 
above. Accepting and financing this higher deficit 
would require: 
•  	  Increasing privatization receipts: however, this 
source of windfall revenues is already   ex-
hausted. 
•  	  Increasing borrowing: we strongly recommend 
to refrain from a policy of expanding state debt 
during times of high economic growth, which 
is   unsustainable in the long run and repre­
sents   a most dangerous attitude towards pub­
lic finances. 
There is thus a clear-cut need to implement 
corrective measures, i.e. expenditure cuts and/or 
revenue increases. However, all of these options 
are subject to constraints. 
1. Cut expenditures 
•  	  Cancel social aid to pensioners: this will inc­
rease social and political pressure. 
Social aid to pensioners is provided to around 11 
m   people, i.e. to about one fourth of the populati­
on. Cutting back on social aid would inevitably 
provoke social and political problems. Moreover, 
a selective social expenditure cut is   difficult to 
explain. However, the government should not 
incorporate additional political promises, such as 
those made by the candidates   during the Presi­
dential campaign 2004 (Table 1, column E), into 
the draft budget 2005. 
•  	  Reduce state aid to some sectors: in the short 



















Nevertheless, the government should revise   its 
policy on state aid. Sticking to the nominal a­
mount of   finance envisaged by the “Ukrainian 
Coal” program and not increasing state support to 
agriculture directly out of the budget, as   compa­
red to 2004, might free resources of   some   1% of 
GDP in the 2005 budget. 
2. Increase revenues 
•  	  Increase tax rates: this   is   incompatible with 
the tax reform path. 
•  	  Cancel tax privileges, thus expanding the tax 
base: this will also increase government’s   VAT 
payments,   i.e. the net budgetary effect is 
smaller than appears. 
The most promising source of additional reve­
nues   is   the elimination of tax privileges. Accor­
ding to Ministry of Finance estimates, the total 
amount of   revenues   lost due to tax privileges is 
some UAH 8.8 bn (or 2.1% of GDP) in 2004. It is 
thus worth to continue the course   of   cutting tax 
privileges, with the exception of   canceling already 
existing special economic zones. In particular   we 
recommend that privileges to car producers and 
to the publishing sector be cut. According to Mi­
nistry of Finance estimates, this   will provide addi­
tional resources of UAH 1 bn and UAH 1.3 bn, 
respectively. 
While this will help decrease the fiscal imba­
lances outlined above, it will not be sufficient to 
prevent a price pressure effect from the budget. 
To counter this will, in turn, require a more active 
anti-inflationary policy stance from the NBU than 
has been necessary in recent years. In sum, sol­
ving the fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances 
brought about during the election campaign calls 
for a joint fiscal and monetary policy response. 
PostScript: Second version of the draft 
budget for 2005 
The new version of the draft budget for 2005 that 
was submitted to Verkhovna Rada on 14 Decem­
ber 2004. The new version incorporates some 
improvements in comparison to the previous 
version. For instance, it does not include additio­
nal social promises, some social expenditures 
were cut. Furthermore, it provides additional 
funds to the Pension fund. In addition, the state 
support of agricultural sector is reduced signifi­
cantly. At the same time, it heritages several ne­
gative features from the previous version of the 
draft budget for 2004. These issues are beyond 
the scope of this paper, and may be covered in 
the next work. Fiscal loosening during the 2004 Presidential election campaign 
Title of article  2005 
m UAH 
Change in 2005 as compared 
to 2004 
m UAH  % 
Social protection and social provision 
  Social protection of persons unable to work 
Social protection of pensioners 
Pensions to persons directly affected by the Chornobyl catastrophe or living 
in the radioactively polluted areas 
 1 Compensation of pensions,  additional payments established by different 
­   state pension programs, state aid to people not eligible for pensions and di
sabled people 
Pensions to military personnel 
    Transfer to the Pension Fund for pensions to retired employees that worked
 
underground * 
Contributions to the non-state pension fund of budgetary employees * 
  Contributions for compulsory state pension insurance paid for some groups
 
of population * 
Social protection of veterans of war and work 
Social protection of families 
Aid for providing dwelling 
Social protection of other groups of the population 








































Transfers to local budget for social programs 
Cash assistance to low-income families and families with children 










N.B.: Total central fiscal expenditures  92,663.9  14,087.7  17.9 
* New program.
 
1 Transfer to the pension fund to replace contributions that should be made by agricultural producers according to the Pension Law.
 
Appendix 
Table A1:  State budget expenditures for social protection and welfare 
according to the Draft Budget 2005 
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